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Available online 19 July 2013 Purpose: Although psychopathy is characterized by amoral behavior, literature on the association between
psychopathy and moral judgment pattern is mixed. Recent evidence suggests that this may be due to the
moderation effect of anxiety (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2011). The current study aims to examine
the psychopathy-utilitarian judgment association in college students.
Method: In this study, a group of 302 college students completed amoral judgment test involving hypothetical
dilemmas. Their psychopathic traits were assessed by the Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Short Form
(PPI-SF) (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996).
Results: Individuals with higher psychopathic traits were more likely to make utilitarian responses to moral
dilemmas. Furthermore, the association between utilitarian responses and psychopathy was more salient
for the behavioral factor of psychopathy (PPI-II), and this association was mediated by self-reported aggres-
sion. However, the moderating effect of anxiety was not found.
Conclusions: These results build upon work on utilitarian moral judgment in psychopathic individuals in a
non-incarcerated, non-institutionalized sample, and have important implications for the behavioral correc-
tion system.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Psychopathy is a constellation of personality traits characterized by
callous and impulsive antisocial behavior. Emotional deficits,
in particular low fear reactivity, and behavioral dysregulation have
been argued to be the core processes in the development of psychopa-
thy (Fowles & Dindo, 2009; Hare, 2003; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993).
Unsurprisingly, their emotional and behavioral traits have devastating
effects on society. According to Kiehl and Buckholtz (2010), psycho-
paths cost the nation roughly $250 to $400 billion a year due to trials,
prison stays and inflicted damage. Bernard Madoff, the psychopathic
operator of one of the largest financial frauds in the U.S., stole about
$65 billion from his clients. And psychopaths are not just isolated to
the few “bad, corrupt apples” at the top. Psychopaths exploit the trust
of coworkers and their managers, andmanipulate friends and strangers
(Babiak & Hare, 2007; Coid, Yang, Ullrich, Roberts, & Hare, 2009). Yet al-
though psychopaths have such a devastating effect on society, there is
only limited experimental data on how they form moral judgments.
One moral decision-making task that has been used to explore
the psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral
judgment in psychopathy is the scenario task. In its general form,
participants read a hypothetical scenario, and are asked to decide
whether they would commit some harm in order to achieve a certain
goal. Based on Greene’s dual process theory, there are two competing
processes, supported by neurological systems, which are part of
making moral judgments. On one hand, we may strongly feel that
an action is inherently wrong. On the other hand, we may engage in
cost-benefit analysis and decide that the action can serve the greater
good. Greene uses this theory to explain why people report being
unwilling to push a man down a footbridge to stop a trolley from run-
ning over five people, and yet are willing to flip a switch so that the
trolley changes course to hit one man rather than five. In the first,
“personal” moral scenario, a dominant, negative emotional response
is associated with the action, which elicits moral disapproval. In con-
trast, the latter, “impersonal”moral scenario does not have any asso-
ciated dominant response, and thus produces a rational utilitarian
decision (Greene, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen,
2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001).
This theory has been supported by brain imaging data which have
identified that during moral decision-making tasks the “executive
brain center” - prefrontal cortex - is associated with rational processing
(Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Young & Koenigs, 2007) whereas emotional
regions including anterior temporal lobes and anterior cingulate gyrus
are involved in emotional processing (Robertson et al., 2007). In addi-
tion, patients with fronto-temporal lobe dementia or ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex damage who have noted emotional deficits, have also
shown more utilitarian responses (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di
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Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto, Ladavas, Mattioli, &
di Pellegrino, 2010). Taken together, these findings suggest that brain
regions including the anterior cingulate cortex, the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex, the amygdala, and hippocampus are critically involved
in moral reasoning.
Given the critical role of emotion in moral judgment and striking
social/emotional deficits observed in psychopaths, one might expect
to findmore utilitarian judgment in individuals with high psychopathic
traits. However, the evidence has been mixed. Using Greene’s moral
task, some empirical studies have supported this hypothesis (Bartels &
Pizarro, 2011; Landon & Delmas, 2012), whereas others have failed to
find the association between psychopathy and utilitarian preferences
(Cima, Tonnaer, & Houser, 2010; Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Pujol
et al., 2011). Despite the mixed findings at the behavioral level, fMRI
data have indicated that reduced activity in regions including ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex and amygdala during the evaluation of moral
dilemmas is associated with psychopathy scores (Glenn et al., 2009).
In addition, a baseline network alteration that leads to a functional dis-
connection between emotional and cognitive elements in moral judg-
ment has also been found in criminal psychopaths (Pujol et al., 2011).
Koenigs and colleagues (2011) have hypothesized that failure to
find the association between psychopathy and utilitarian moral judg-
ment may be due to the heterogeneity of the group. In a group of incar-
ceratedmales, they found that although compared to non-psychopathic
controls, both low- andhigh-anxious psychopaths aremore likely to en-
dorse the impersonal moral actions, only the low-anxious psychopath
exhibit abnormally utilitarian personal moral judgment (Koenigs
et al., 2011), suggesting that anxiety may moderate the relationship
between psychopathy and moral judgment. However, it is unknown if
these associations between psychopathy, anxiety, and utilitarian
responses can be generalized in non-institutionalized populations. In
the current study, the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) – Trait
scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) was used
to assess anxiety level in college students. This 20-item scale has been
used in several studies to examine the associations between anxiety
and psychopathic traits (Uzieblo, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2007) in
college samples.
The goal of the current study was to examine the association
between psychopathic personality traits and moral judgment in
a non-clinical, non-forensic sample. Although Bartels and Pizarro
(2011) found that psychopathic personality traits, as measured by the
Self-Report Psychopathy form (Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2012),
were positively associated with utilitarian responses to moral di-
lemmas, it was unclear which of the factor(s) of psychopathy would
be associated with utilitarian moral responses. This issue is important
as this has implications for gaining a more comprehensive picture of
the processes behind psychopathy and moral decision-making. Thus,
one of the goals of this study was to explore the factor(s) associated
with utilitarian moral judgments.
In the current study, we assessed psychopathic traits using the
Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Short Form (PPI-SF; Lilienfeld
& Andrews, 1996). The Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI;
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) is one of themost widely used instruments
to assess psychopathic characteristics in undergraduate samples, and
the PPI-short form (PPI-SF) was developed from the original PPI and
includes 56 items. In a sample of 758 college students a three-factor
model (PPI-I, PPI-II, and Coldheartedness) has been derived with the
PPI-SF (Smith, Edens, & Vaughn, 2011). Studies have suggested that
PPI-I is strongly positively associated with interpersonal dominance,
and negatively related to internalizing psychopathology, including
anxiety and depression (Benning, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005; Edens &
McDermott, 2010; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). In contrast, PPI-II tends
to be positively correlatedwith internalizingmeasures and is positively
correlated with externalizing measures including impulsivity, hostility,
and aggression (Edens &McDermott, 2010; Lilienfeld &Widows, 2005).
Behavioral genetic studies have indicated that PPI-I was associated
with a reduced genetic risk for internalizing disorders, and PPI-II was
associated with an increased genetic risk for externalizing disorders
(Blonigen, Hicks, Krueger, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005). More interestingly,
Smith and colleagues (2011) have found that PPI-II is positively associ-
ated with Machiavellianism and deception and negatively correlated
with extraversion. Since greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions
have been found to be positively related to Machiavellianism (Bartels
& Pizarro, 2011), we hypothesize that utilitarian judgment will be
more closely related to PPI-II than PPI-I.
Another issue concerns the possible mediating effect of aggression
on the relationship between psychopathy andmoral judgment. Amedi-
ation relationship is said to occurwhen thepredictor variable influences
the outcome indirectly through its relationship with a mediating vari-
able (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Significant associations have been found
between psychopathy and aggression (Porter & Woodworth, 2006),
but no study has yet examined the link between aggression and moral
judgment. It is possible that people high in psychopathic personality
are simply more aggressive and thus willing to endorse killing actions.
It is therefore also important to investigate if high aggression could
partly account for the association between psychopathy and utilitarian
judgment. Given that PPI-II but not PPI-I is associated with aggressive
behavior, we hypothesize that aggression may mediate the association
between PPI-II and utilitarian judgments.
The present study
We examine the associations between utilitarian judgment, psycho-
pathic personality traits, anxiety, and aggression in a group of male
and female college students. Based on Koenigs et al. (2011)’s finding,
we hypothesize that:
1) Individuals with high psychopathic personality traits would be
more likely to make utilitarian judgments for impersonal and per-
sonal moral dilemmas.
2) The association between psychopathy and utilitarian response to
personal moral dilemmas would be moderated by anxiety: only
individuals with high psychopathy AND low anxiety would show
significantlymore utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas.
3) Utilitarian moral judgment would be more closely related to PPI-II
but not PPI-I, and this associationwould bemediated by self-report
aggression.
Method
Participants
Three hundred and two undergraduate students (73% females,
mean age = 21.97, SD = 6.19) from an urban college participated for
course credit. They were from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds:
39.6% Caucasian, 25.2% Asian, 14.4% African American, 11.7% Hispanic,
and 9.1% from other racial backgrounds. They were tested in a small
group setting (typically one to five participants per session). Partici-
pants responded to 15 dilemmas and a series of self-report question-
naires measuring their psychopathic personality traits, trait anxiety,
aggression, and demographic information. All procedures were ap-
proved by the university IRB, and informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Measures
Moral dilemmas
A total of 15 dilemmas (4 non-moral, 4 impersonal moral, and
7 personal moral scenarios, see Appendix A) selected from a previ-
ously published set (Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007) were
presented in random order. To be consistent with the question format
used in previous studies (Cima et al., 2010; Koenigs et al., 2011),
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participants were asked to answer “Yes” or “No” to the hypothetical
questions relating to the dilemmas, in the form of, “Would you … in
order to …?” In non-moral dilemmas, participants were asked to
make decisions that involved no harm. For example, they had to de-
cide whether to substitute preferred macadamia nuts for walnuts in
a batch of brownies, even though the recipe called for walnuts.
Non-moral dilemmas served as a control and baseline condition.
In impersonal moral dilemmas, participants were asked to make
decisions that involved harm, but did not require them to directly
commit harm to another person. For example, they were asked to de-
cide whether they would flip a switch so that noxious fumes from a
room with three people would flow into a room with one person. In
personal moral dilemmas, participants were asked to make decisions
that involved harm, but this time required them to directly commit
harm to another person. For example, they had to decide whether
to transplant the organs of a relatively healthy patient to five dying
patients. “Yes” responses corresponded to “utilitarian” decisions that
maximized utility or the greater good (Greene, 2003). There was no
time limit for reading the scenario description or responding to the
question. Following themethod of Koenigs et al. (2011), the proportion
of “yes” responses for each type of scenario was calculated for each
individual.
Psychopathic personality inventory – short form (PPI-SF Lilienfeld &
Andrews, 1996)
Psychopathic personality was assessed using the PPI-SF and par-
ticipants answered on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = false, 2 = mostly
false, 3 = mostly true, 4 = true). The PPI-SF consists of eight sub-
scales with internal consistencies, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha
for the undergraduate sample, ranging from .63 to .80 (Smith et al.,
2011), and has good test - retest reliability (Lilienfeld & Andrews,
1996; Poythress, Edens, & Lilienfeld, 1998). More recent factor analysis
by Benning et al. (2003) and Smith et al. (2011) on these eight subscales
revealed evidence for two largely orthogonal factors. Factor 1(PPI-I) is
the sum of the standardized scores on Stress Immunity, Social Potency,
and Fearless subscales, while Factor 2 (PPI-II) is the sum of the stan-
dardized scores on Blame Externalization, Machiavellian Egocentricity,
Carefree Nonplanfulness, and Impulsive Nonconformity. The eighth
subscale, Coldheartedness, failed to load substantially onto either factor
(Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003; Smith et al., 2011).
Internal consistency in the current sample for the subscales ranged from
.50 (Coldheartedness) to .81 (Blame Externalization). In the following
analyses, PPI-I, PPI-II, Coldheartedness, and PPI total score (sum of the
eight subscales) were used.
Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire (RPQ Raine et al., 2006)
RPQ was used to indicate predatory (proactive) and impulsive
(reactive) dimensions. The RPQ consists of 23 items of which 12
items make up the proactive subscale (e.g. “How often have you got
others to gang up on someone else?”) and 11 make up the reactive
subscale (for example “How often have you gotten angry or mad or
hit others when teased?”). Earlier studies have shown good internal
reliabilities for total RPQ, with reactive and proactive subscale scores
all above .81 (Raine et al., 2006).The RPQ has demonstrated good va-
lidity and the two factors of reactive and proactive aggression have
been substantiated with confirmatory factor analysis (Raine et al.,
2006). Internal consistency in the current sample was .82 for the
total RPQ. For the reactive subscale internal consistency was .76, for
the proactive subscale it was .69.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory –Trait version (STAI–T, Spielberger,
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983)
The STAI-T is a questionnaire comprising of 20 items designed
to measure trait anxiety (e.g. “I worry too much over something
that really doesn’t matter”). Participants answer according to how
they generally feel on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = almost never,
2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, and 4 = very much). It assesses
trait anxiety, but also relates to measures of depression and negative
affect (Bados, Gomez-Benito, & Balaguer, 2010). We used the STAI-T
because of its wide usage, history of good internal reliability, good
test-retest reliability, and good convergent validity (Antony, Orsillo,
& Roemer, 2001; Spielberger, 1989; Spielberger et al., 1983). In addi-
tion, we used the trait version rather than the state version because it
is more theoretically consistent with our hypotheses – we are inter-
ested not in how anxiety at a particular moment would affect the
relationship between psychopathy and moral judgments. Rather, we
are interested in how a general feeling of anxiety is likely to moderate
the relationship. Internal consistency in the current sample was .90.
Statistical analyses
Paired sample t-tests were conducted to compare participants’
responses to different types of dilemmas. Effect sizes were reported
using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988). Multiple regressions were used to
examine the relationships between psychopathic traits and utilitarian
responses. To test for potential moderating effects of anxiety, hierarchi-
cal multiple regression analyses were conducted for the proportion of
“yes” responses to overall moral dilemmas, personal moral dilemmas,
and impersonal moral dilemmas separately. For these analyses, anxiety
and PPI-total score were entered by subtracting the sample mean from
each participant’s score. In step 1, the proportion of “yes” responseswas
regressed onto gender and PPI-total score. In step 2, the main effect of
anxiety and a multiplicative interaction term was entered into the
equation to test for the interaction between anxiety and psychopathy.
To examine the potential mediating effect of aggression, we first
followed Baron and Kenny (Baron & Kenny, 1986)’s criteria to assess
if true mediation was present. The paths between independent,
dependent and mediator variables were assessed by ordinary least
squares (regression). The Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) was used to test
whether themediator significantly attenuated the influence of the inde-
pendent variable on the dependent variable. Finally, a 2-step regression
analysis was conducted to examine if any remaining relationship be-
tween psychopathy and utilitarian responses was still significant after
controlling for the aggression mediator.
Results
Moral (impersonal vs. personal) vs. non-moral dilemmas
We first compared participants’ responses between moral and
non-moral scenarios. The proportion of “yes” responses to moral di-
lemmas was significantly lower than that to non-moral dilemmas
(t (301) = 29.16, p b .001; for moral dilemmas, M = .40, SD = .19;
for non-moral dilemmas, M = .85, SD = .19, d = 2.37). Participants
also gave fewer utilitarian responses (i.e. smaller proportion of
“yes” responses) to personal compared to impersonal moral di-
lemmas (t (301) = 4.15, p b .001; personal moral dilemmas,M = .38,
SD = .25; impersonal moral dilemmas, M = .44, SD = .22, d = 0.24)
(Fig. 1).
Psychopathic personality and utilitarian responses
Table 1 shows inter-correlations among main study variables. Par-
ticipants who had higher PPI total scores (overall psychopathy) indi-
cated a greater preference for “yes” responses to the moral dilemmas.
This was true for the overall analysis, when responses across all 11
moral dilemmas were collapsed (r = .16, p b .01), as well as for the
personal moral dilemmas in particular (r = .14, p = .02). The rela-
tionship between PPI total scores and utilitarian responses to imper-
sonal moral dilemmas approached significance (r = .11, p = .05).
Consistent with our third hypothesis, these significant relations with
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utilitarian responses were mainly driven by PPI-II (rs = .18 to .24,
p b .05). PPI-I was not correlated with any of the decision variables.
Compared to females, males scored significantly higher on PPI total
(male M = 129.39, SD = 13.99, female M = 119.49, SD = 13.72,
d = 0.71) and factor scores (PPI-I, male M = 0.28, SD = .77, female
M = -.10, SD = 0.66, d = 0.53; PPI-II, male M = 0.20, SD = 0.61,
female M = -0.07, SD = 0.62, d = 0.44; and Coldheartedness, male
M = 0.21, SD = 1.06, femaleM = -0.08, SD = 0.97, d = 0.29). Males
also scored lower on anxiety (male M = 40.88, SD = 9.85, female
M = 45.22, SD = 10.61, d = -0.42) and were more likely to make
utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas (male M = 0.47,
SD = 0.26, female M = 0.34, SD = 0.23, d = 0.53). However, males
did not differ from females in their responses to impersonal moral,
non-moral dilemmas or reported aggression.
To control for the observed effects of gender on the responses to
moral dilemmas, we conducted multiple regressions for the utilitari-
an responses using PPI-II as a predictor while controlling for gender.
As Table 2 shows, the relationship between utilitarian preferences
and PPI-II was robust even when gender was taken into account.1
Moderating effect of anxiety
Anxiety was not correlated with any of the decision measures.
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to test for
potential moderating effects of anxiety. As shown in Table 3, there
was no significant interaction between anxiety and psychopathy
for the utilitarian responses to overall moral dilemmas or personal
moral dilemmas. For impersonal moral dilemmas, the addition of an
interaction term and anxiety added 3% of the variance to the prediction
of the utilitarian responses, and the interaction between total psychop-
athy and anxiety approached significance (p = .06). Similar analyses
were conducted with PPI-II replacing PPI-total in the equations. There
was no significant interaction between anxiety and PPI-II in predicting
for utilitarian responses to any type of the moral dilemmas. Thus, our
second hypothesis was not supported.
Mediating effect of aggression
As can be seen in Table 1, participants who scored higher on aggres-
sionmeasuresweremore likely tomake utilitarian responses for overall
moral dilemmas, in particular the impersonal moral dilemmas (r = .14
to .33, p b .05). None of the aggression variables were significantly cor-
related to responses to personal moral or non-moral dilemmas. Since
proactive and reactive aggression showed similar relationship to all
other variables (see Table 1), the following analyses were conducted
using total aggression score.
After controlling for total aggression, the amount of variance in
utilitarian responses to overall moral dilemmas explained by PPI-II
was reduced from 5.6% (F = 17.88, p b .001) to 1.7% (F = 3.77,
p = .05). The Sobel test showed that this reduction was statistically
significant (z = 3.36, p b .001). Similarly, the amount of variance
in utilitarian responses to impersonal moral dilemmas explained by
PPI-II was reduced from 3% (F = 6.75, p = .01) to 0.1% after controlling
for aggression. The Sobel test showed that this was a statistically signifi-
cant reduction (z = 4.90, p b .01). Regression analyses indicated that the
residual variance in utilitarian responses explained by PPI-II after con-
trolling for aggression was no longer significant (F = 0.04, p = .84),
suggesting that aggression completely mediated the psychopathy-
utilitarian responses relationship for impersonal moral scenarios.2
Fig. 1. Proportion of “yes” responses to overall moral, non-moral, personal, and imper-
sonal dilemmas in college students. Bars refer to 1 standard error of the mean.
Table 1
Intercorrelations between main study variables, together with means and SDs
PPI-total PPI-I PPI-II Coldheartedness Anxiety Aggression Proactive
aggression
Reactive
aggression
Moral Personal
moral
Impersonal
moral
Non-moral Gender
(1 = M,
2 = F)
PPI-total 1 .73*** .69*** .32*** -.09 .33*** .39*** .21** .16** .14* .11a -.03 -.30***
PPI-I 1 .06 .19** -.41*** .05 .13a -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 .09 -.24***
PPI-II 1 -.02 .39*** .50*** .50*** .41*** .24*** .21*** .18** -.09 -.19**
Coldheartedness 1 -.31*** -.18** -.09 -.22** .03 .04 -.01 -.14* -.13*
Anxiety 1 .21** .12 .24** .11 .08 .09 -.06 .18*
Aggression 1 .86*** .91*** .21** .09 .33*** -.08 -.07
Proactive Aggression 1 .58*** .14* .03 .29*** -.06 -.11
Reactive Aggression 1 .23** .12a .30*** -.09 -.03
Moral 1 .92*** .63*** .03 -.16**
Personal Moral 1 .27*** .02 -.22***
Impersonal Moral 1 .04 .03
Non-moral 1 -.02
Gender 1
Mean 122.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 44.16 12.51 2.97 9.25 .40 .38 .44 .85 -
SD 14.47 .71 .63 1.00 10.60 5.92 3.02 3.79 .19 .25 .22 .19 -
Note.
* p b .05, ** p b .01, ***p b .001, a p b .10.
Table 2
Relationships between PPI-II and utilitarian responses, controlling for gender –
standardized betas
PPI-II Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)
Moral .21*** -.12*
Personal Moral .17** -.19**
Impersonal Moral .19** .06
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Discussion
In this study, we investigated the association between psycho-
pathic traits and moral judgments. Results supported our first and
third hypotheses. As expected, individuals with high psychopathic
traits were generally more willing than those with low traits to en-
dorse impersonal or personal harms or rule violations in order to
achieve certain beneficial outcomes. More interestingly, utilitarian re-
sponses to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas were positively
correlated with the second factor of PPI (PPI-II, including Blame Exter-
nalization, Machiavellian Egocentricity, Carefree Nonplanfulness, and
Impulsive Nonconformity) but not the first factor (PPI-I, including
Stress Immunity, Social Potency, and Fearlessness) or Coldheartedness,
and the association between psychopathy and utilitarian moral judg-
ments was mediated by aggressive behavior. Our second hypothesis,
however, was not supported: anxiety did not moderate the associa-
tion between psychopathy and utilitarian response to personal moral
dilemmas.
Our finding suggests that the association between utilitarian judg-
ment and psychopathic traits is mainly driven by these externalizing
characteristics rather than the affective/interpersonal factor of psy-
chopathy. As mentioned in the introduction, PPI-I and PPI-II largely
represent a global indicator of (reduced) internalizing and (increased)
externalizing psychopathology, respectively. These differential rela-
tionships further demonstrate that it is critical to disaggregate poten-
tially heterogeneous psychopathological and personality constructs
into narrower, homogeneous components (Fowles & Dindo, 2009;
Lynam & Widiger, 2007; Smith et al., 2011) to fully understand the
mechanism and processes underlying moral judgments in psycho-
pathic individuals.
In contrast to our prediction, we failed to find moderating effect of
anxiety, suggesting that the behavioral/emotional deficit that gives
rise to utilitarian judgments characterizes all those who score high
on psychopathic traits, regardless of anxiety level. One possible reason
for the discrepant finding from Koenigs et al. (2011) is that Koenigs
et al. examined the association in an incarcerated sample whereas
we focused on non-institutionalized college sample. Different findings
seem to suggest that differences between criminal and noncriminal
psychopathy are both quantitative and qualitative in nature.
We also found that males gave significantlymore utilitarian answers
to personal moral dilemmas when compared to females, although there
were no gender differences in utilitarian responses to non-moral di-
lemmas or impersonal moral dilemmas. This was consistent with prior
literature (Fumagalli et al., 2010; Youssef et al., 2012), suggesting that
the cognitive-emotional processes and the underlying neurobiological
mechanisms involved in evaluating personal moral dilemmas differ in
males and in females (Fumagalli et al., 2010). Although Coldheartedness
was negatively correlated with the proportion of “yes” responses to
non-moral dilemmas, it was not significantly correlated with the utili-
tarian responses to personal or impersonal moral dilemmas in our
study. This may be due to the relatively low internal reliability of the
subscale (alpha = .50), and a Type II error is possible. Nevertheless,
we found Coldheartedness to be significantly correlated with PPI-I but
not PPI-II, which are consistent with prior literature (Smith et al., 2011).
One of the limitations of the study is that self-report scales were
used throughout this research. Despite its practical and effective
quality of assessing traits of interests, this method may be prone to
response bias. Although psychopathic traits, aggression, and moral
judgment have been found to be significantly related to socially desir-
able responding (Warren, 2009), the same study has found that so-
cially desirable responding did not have a significant impact on the
associations between psychopathy, aggression, and empathy. None-
theless, future studies could use other measures, such as utilizing
role-play in the laboratory or other behavioral paradigms to replicate
and build upon this research. The second issue is representativeness.
There were significantly more females than males in our sample,
although in the general population psychopaths are predominantly
males. This was mainly due to the gender imbalance inherent within
the psychology course make-up at the college, with approximately
70-80% of psychology students being female. Although we controlled
for the effect of gender in the analyses, future studies with a large
sample or an equal number of males and females are required to in-
vestigate the effect of gender imbalance on the associations of interest.
Additionally, despite our participants being ethnically and socioeco-
nomically diverse, we used a convenience sample of college students.
They may differ qualitatively from those who have been convicted or
incarcerated, and hence the relationship between the dimensions of
psychopathic traits may relate differently to moral judgments. This,
in turn, would imply different antisocial behavior prevention strate-
gies for the two sets of populations.
Conclusions
In addition to building upon prior research on moral decision-
making of psychopaths, our research has contributed to the under-
standing of the specific factors of psychopathy that are associated
with utilitarian decision-making. Our results suggest that external-
izing traits contribute more strongly to utilitarian responses, and
Table 3
Hierarchical regression analyses testing for the potential moderating role of anxiety
Moral Personal Moral Impersonal Moral
β R2 R2 change β R2 R2 change β R2 R2 change
PPI-total
Gender -.20** -.27*** .04
PPI-T .06 .03 .07
0.05 .08 .01
Gender -.24** -.30*** -.01
PPI-T .06 .04 .08
Anxiety .15* .13a .10
Anxiety × PPI-T .07 .01 .14a
0.08 0.03a .10 .02 .03 .03a
PPI-II
Gender -.19* -.26** .04
PPI-II .19* .17* .11
.08 .11 .01
Gender -.21** -.27*** .02
PPI-II .16a .14a .10
Anxiety .07 .07 .03
Anxiety × PPI-II .04 -.01 .10
.09 .01 .11 .01 .02 .01
Note. * p b .05, ** p b .01, ***p b .001, a p b .10.
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this externalizing – utilitarianism association becomes more salient
in the impersonal dilemmas when the prepotent negative emotional
responses that oppose acts of harmareweaker or nonexistent. Psychop-
athy incurs an enormous toll on society, and understanding how
psychopathic individuals make moral decisions is important. If their
tendency to maximize outcome is largely associated with certain char-
acteristics such as blame externalization rather than fearlessness, then
correction programs should focus on exercising responsibility rather
than trying to intimidate psychopathic offenders with the negative con-
sequences of offending. Thus, for example, the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation Honor Program, which emphasizes
personal responsibility and commitment to personal growth
(Hartman, 2007), may be more successful than a program in which se-
nior inmates recount stories of how their crimes destroyed their
futures.
Appendix A
Non-Moral Scenarios:
1. You are bringing home a number of plants from a store that is
about two miles from your home. The trunk of your car, which
you’ve lined with plastic to catch the mud from the plants, will
hold most of the plants you’ve bought. You could bring all the
plants home in one trip, but this would require putting some of
the plants in the back seat as well as in the trunk. By putting
some of the plants in the back seat you will ruin your fine leather
upholstery which would cost thousands of dollars to replace.
Would you make two trips home in order to avoid ruining the
upholstery of your car?
2. You have decided to make a batch of brownies for yourself. You
open your recipe book and find a recipe for brownies. The recipe
calls for a cup of chopped walnuts. You don’t like walnuts, but
you do like macadamia nuts. As it happens you have both kinds
of nuts available to you.
Would you substitutemacadamia nuts for walnuts in order to avoid
eating walnuts?
3. You need to travel from New York to Boston in order to attend a
meeting that starts at 2PM. You can take either the train or the
bus. The train will get you there just in time for your meeting no
matter what. The bus is scheduled to arrive an hour before your
meeting, but the bus is occasionally several hours late because of
traffic. It would be nice to have an extra hour before the meeting,
but you cannot afford to be late.
Do you take the train or the bus?
4. An old friend has invited you to spend the weekend with him at his
summer home some ways up the coast from where you are. You
intend to travel there by car, and there are two routes that you
can take: the highway and the coastal road. The highway will get
you to your friend’s house in about three hours, but the scenery
along the highway is very boring. The coastal route will get you
to your friend’s house in about three hours and fifteen minutes,
and the scenery along the coastal road is breathtakingly beautiful.
Would you take the coastal route (scenic but slower) or the high-
way (boring but faster)?
Impersonal Moral Scenarios:
5. You are the late-night watchman in a hospital. Due to an accident
in the building next door, there are deadly fumes rising up through
the hospital’s ventilation system. In a certain room of the hospital
are three patients. In another room there is a single patient. If
you do nothing the fumes will rise up into the room containing
the three patients and cause their deaths. The only way to avoid
the deaths of these patients is to hit a certain switch, which will
cause the fumes to bypass the room containing the three patients.
As a result of doing this the fumes will enter the room containing
the single patient, causing his death.
Would you hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the three
patients?
6. You work for the Bureau of Health, a government agency. You are
deciding whether or not your agency should encourage the use of
a certain recently developed vaccine. The vast majority of people
who take the vaccine develop an immunity to a certain deadly
disease, but a very small number of people who take the vaccine
will actually get the disease that the vaccine is designed to pre-
vent. All the available evidence, which is very strong, suggests
that the chances of getting the disease due to lack of vaccination
are much higher than the chances of getting the disease by taking
the vaccine.
Would you direct your agency to encourage the use of this vaccine?
7. You are walking down the street with a friend, and he drops his
wallet as he is getting into his car to leave. You open the wallet
and find that it contains several hundred dollars and some credit
cards. Your friend is wealthy. You, however, have been hit by
hard times recently and could really use some extra cash. You con-
sider sending the wallet back to your friend without the cash,
keeping the cash for yourself.
Would you keep the money you found in the wallet?
8. You have been trying to find a job lately without much success.
You figure that you would be more likely to get hired if you had
a more impressive resume. You could put some false information
on your resume in order to make it more impressive. By doing
this you might ultimately manage to get hired, beating out several
candidates who are actually more qualified than you are.
Would you put false information on your resume?
Personal Moral Scenarios:
9. You are a doctor. You have five patients, each of whom is about
to die due to failing organs. You have another patient who
is healthy. The only way you can save the lives of the first
five patients is to transplant five of this young man’s organs
(against his will) into the bodies of the other five patients. If
you do this, the young man will die, but the other five patients
will live.
Would you perform this transplant in order to save five of your
patients?
10. You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the
ship has to be abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many
more people than they were designed to carry. The lifeboat
you’re in is sitting dangerously low in the water – a few inches
lower and it will sink. The seas start to get rough, and the boat
begins to fill withwater. If nothing is done it will sink before the
rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die. However,
there is an injured person who will not survive in any case. If
you throw that person overboard, the boat will stay afloat and
the remaining passengers will be saved.
Would you throw this person overboard in order to save the
lives of the remaining passengers?
11. You are the leader of a small group of soldiers. You are on your
way back from a completed mission deep in enemy territory
when one of your men has stepped in a trap that has been
set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap is connected
to a radio device that by now has alerted the enemy to your
presence. They will soon be on their way. If the enemy finds
your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs
you not to leave him behind, but if you try to take him with
you your entire group will be captured. The only way to pre-
vent this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot him
yourself.
Would you shoot this soldier in order to prevent him from
being tortured by the enemy?
12. You are the captain of a military submarine travelling
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underneath a large iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused
you to lose most of your oxygen supply and has injured one
of your crew who is quickly losing blood. The injured crew
member is going to die from his wounds no matter what hap-
pens. The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the entire crew
to make it to the surface. The only way to save the other crew
members is to shoot dead the injured crew member so that
there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to sur-
vive.
Would you kill the fatally injured crew member in order to
save the lives of the remaining crew members?
13. It is wartime and you and your two children, ages eight and
five, are living in a territory that has been occupied by the
enemy. At the enemy’s headquarters is a doctor who performs
painful experiments on humans that inevitably lead to death.
He intends to perform experiments on one of your children,
but he will allow you to choose which of your children will
be experimented upon. If you refuse to bring on of your chil-
dren to his laboratory, he will find both of them and experi-
ment on both of them.
Would you bring one of your children to the laboratory in
order to avoid having them both die?
14. A viral epidemic has spread across the globe killing millions
of people. You have developed two substances in your home
laboratory. You know that one of them is a vaccine, but you
don’t know which one. You also know that the other one is
deadly. Once you figure out which substance is the vaccine
you can use it to save millions of lives. You have with you
two people who are under your care, and the only way to iden-
tify the vaccine is to inject each of these people with one of the
two substances. One person will live, the other will die, and
you will be able to start saving lives with your vaccine.
Would you kill one of these people with a deadly injection in
order to identify a vaccine that will save millions of lives?
15. You are in a hospital waiting to visit a sick friend. A young man
sitting next to you explains that his father is very ill. The doctors
believe that he has a week to live at most. He explains that
his father has a substantial life insurance policy that expires at
midnight. If his father dies before midnight, this young man
will receive a very large sum of money. He says that the
money would mean a great deal to him and that no good will
come from his father’s living a few more days. He offers you
half a million dollars to go up to his father’s room and smother
his father with a pillow.
Would you kill this man’s father in order to get money for your-
self and this young man?
Notes
1. We also examined the effect of interaction between PPI-I and PPI-II. Regression
analyses indicated that the interaction was not statistically significant after controlling
for the main effect of gender, PPI-I and PPI-II.
2. Separate analyses were also conducted to examine the potential mediation
effects of proactive and reactive aggression on the psychopathy-utilitarian responses
relationship. Similar findings were found for both types of aggression.
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